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IN (OR OUT OF) THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: 
WARF V. GERON AND LESSONS FOR CANADA 
MATTHEW HERDER I 
ABSTRACT 
Four days after President George W. Bush addressed America re-
garding human embryonic stem cell ("hESC") research in August 2001, 
a lawsuit was filed by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation 
('WARF") against Geron Corporation ("Geron"). WARF holds patents 
in respect of hESC technologies pioneered by James Thomson. The 
parties were unable to negotiate licences for additional hESC types. In 
January 2002, WARF and Geron announced that a new agreement had 
been reached. This paper examines the antecedent question: should the 
hESC technologies have been patentable in the first place? 
The reason for pursuing hESC research appears to be the possibility 
to improve human health. But hESC research also caITies great eco-
nomic potential. Express prioritization of these dual benefits is lacking. 
The practice of patenting hESC technologies provides a clue. The em-
pirical support for the proposition that patent rights increase scientific 
innovation is minimal. Two arguments favour the status quo: 
(i) the researchers who 'invent' the technologies are entitled to a 
property right (Lockean argument); and, 
(ii) circumscribing access to secure investment is acceptable be-
cause an overall benefit is produced (utilitarian argument). 
However, both arguments rest on dubious premises. Most notably, the 
"tragedy of the anticommons", added transaction costs, and depreciated 
scientific creativity undermine the claim that a net benefit will accrue. 
Preserving the current regime therefore attaches higher priority to com-
mercial interests. Two responses are left: modifying the patent system or 
I Matthew Herder graduated from Memorial University ofNewfoundland with a BSc. (Hons.) 
in Psychology. He will graduate with an LLB in 2003, and has been working as a research 
assitant in the Department of Bioethics since attending Dalhousie. Research for this paper was 
funded in part by a grant from Associated Medical Services Inc., and a grant from the Stem 
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placing hESC technologies in the public domain. Only the latter will 
ensure that the potential health benefits of hESC research are the top 
priority. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This comment takes a close look at a recent contractual dispute 
between a private corporation and a group of public researchers over an 
intellectual property rights licensing arrangement for various human 
embryonic stem cell (hESC) technologies. In this paper the public 
interest in hESC research is defined, and the claim that patents bolster 
the public interest is critically examined. Lockean property and utilitar-
ian arguments are found to rest on dubious premises and fall short of 
providing sufficient justification to support patenting hESC technolo-
gies. Yet patenting hESC technologies is the present starting position. 
Inconsistent with the public interest, it appears that the potential eco-
nomic benefits are given priority over the potential health benefits of 
hESC research. The likelihood and the means by which this might be 
reversed is briefly considered in the Canadian context. 
II. WARF v. GERON 
1. The Licensing Agreement & The Federal Lawsuit 
In 1996, the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation ("WARF") 
entered into a contractual relationship with a private entity, Geron 
Corporation ("Geron") of Menlo Park, California. Under the arrange-
ment, Geron provided funding for a group of researchers at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Madison headed by James Thomson, and in return 
WARF granted Geron a nonexclusive right to develop therapeutic and 
diagnostic products under the WARF primate stem cell patent. 1 In 1998, 
Thomson et al. made a scientific breakthrough, pioneering the deriva-
tion of stem cells from human blastocysts.2 
1 Brief for Plaintiff at 18, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation v. Geron Corporation, D. 
Wisc. (F. Cir. 2001) (No. 0 l-C-0459). 
2 J.A. Thomson et al., "Embryonic Stern Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts" (1998) 
282:5391 Science 1145. 
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Since that time there have been a number of developments. 
Thomson and his co-researchers have filed and have been granted 
patents pertaining to hESC research, which are held by WARF. They 
have also developed five viable hESC lines, which again, WARF holds. 
According to WARF, officials at Geron marveled at the prospect of the 
results of Thomson's research. In April 1999, WARF entered into a new 
agreement with Geron (the "1999 agreement or licence"), which li-
censed six cell types and methods relating to their production (i.e. 
derivation technologies) to the company for therapeutic and diagnostic 
applications, on an exclusive basis.3 The licence agreement contained 
an option to add new cell types due to expire on March 31, 2001, which 
was subsequently extended to July 31, 2001.4 In December 2000 the 
parties began to negotiate pursuant to this option. As well, the 1999 
licence granted Geron certain rights relating to research products. Geron 
had insisted that those rights be exclusive, but WARF sought a compro-
mise: only research products and services employing WARF technology 
3 Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 1 at 19. 
4 The option, Section 2C of the 1999 agreement, attached as Exhibit A to WARF's amended 
complaint, reads as follows: 
WARF hereby grants Geron the first option to negotiate an exclusive 
license for the addition of cell types to the Licensed Field. Geron may 
exercise its options under this Section 2C by providing WARF with 
written notice of its desire to add a cell type to the License Field including 
a Development Plan detailing Geron's plan and timeline for bringing 
Products to the market incorporating the new cell type and by paying 
WARF an upfront license fee to be negotiated in good faith between the 
parties factoring in commercially reasonable terms given the advancement 
of cell therapy in therapeutics and diagnostics and the value added by 
Geron. The terms of the exclusive license, other than the upfront license 
fee, shall be identical to the terms set forth in this Agreement, unless 
otherwise negotiated and agreed to by the parties. If the parties fail to agree 
on an upfront license fee for an additional cell type, WARF agrees that it 
will not offer such cell type to any third party on terms more favorable as 
a whole to such licensee than were offered to Geron hereunder for a period 
of eighteen (18) months from the date Geron first exercised its option to 
add a cell type to the Licensed Field. In the context of this Agreement, 
"terms more favorable as a whole" shall mean that the combination of the 
commercial terms, for example the license fee, royalty rate, milestones, 
minimum royalties, and other fees required as consideration for the rights 
granted under the license are not more favorable when taken together to 
the package offered to Geron. The option to add cell types shall expire on 
March 31, 2001 unless extended for an additional period by written 
agreement on terms mutually acceptable to the parties. 
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and incorporating Geron's own patented technology would be subject to 
an exclusive claim. 5 
In the midst of all this, the WARF researchers set up a non-profit 
corporation, WiCell Research Institute Inc. ("WiCell"), acting as a 
subsidiary of WARF and offering to distribute hESC technologies 
online to interested public researchers. Later, WiCell would play a key 
role in helping the National Institutes of Health create its "Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Registry". 6 
On August 13, 2001, just four days after President George W. Bush 
addressed the American nation on the topic of hESC research, 7 a com-
plaint seeking declaratory relief was filed at a federal court in Madison, 
Wisconsin by WARF against Geron. The disagreement had culminated 
on July 31, 2001 when Carl E. Gulbrandsen, the Managing Director of 
WARF, rejected Geron's unilateral attempt to exercise its "first option 
to negotiate" and lay claim to eleven additional cell types. In a letter 
dated August 1, 2001, Geron fired back. In marked contrast to WARF' s 
interpretation, Geron interpreted the "Research Products" clause much 
more expansively: 
Geron has exclusive rights to make, use and sell research tools that 
involve in some way one or more of the six cell types or derivatives 
therefrom and incorporate any other patented technology that Geron 
owns or has the right or license (exclusive or nonexclusive) to use. 
5 Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note I at 19. "Research Products" are defined in Appendix A, iJ 
E of the 1999 agreement, attached as Exhibit C to the amended complaint. The provision 
reads: 
"Research Products" shall refer to and mean products or services that (i) 
are used in research as research tools which would infringe the claims of 
patented technology owned by Geron or which Geron has a right to license 
to use other than the Licensed Patent; and (ii) which employ, are in any 
way produced by the practice of, are identified using or arise out of any 
research involving the inventions claimed in the Licensed Patents or that 
would otherwise constitute infringement of any claims of the Licensed 
Patented Research Products specifically excludes the Materials. 
6 See National Institutes of Health (NIH), News Release, "National Institutes of Health and 
WiCell Research Institute, Inc., Sign Stem Cell Research Agreement" (5 September 2001), 
online: National Institutes of Health <http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/sep200 l/od-05.htm> (date 
accessed: 0 I /11 /15). In November, the NIH launched the registry online, listing 11 participat-
ing entities and total of 64 hESC lines (now 72); see <http://escr.nih.gov/> (date accessed: 0 I/ 
11/15). 
7 See "Text: Bush's Address on Stern Cell Research" The New York Times (10 August 2001) 
online: <http://www.nytimes.com> (date accessed: 01/08/12). 
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This latter component is subject to change over time as Geron acquires 
additional proprietary rights, and the definition as presently structured 
would ultimately lead to complete exclusivity for Research Products 
within the Licensed Field. We understand that this will make it quite 
difficult for WARF to grant licenses to other entities for Research 
Products, since the other entity could never be assured of the extent, or 
even the continued existence, of the rights granted to it. Moreover, 
WARF would breach the terms of its agreement with Geron were it to 
grant rights that conflicted with those granted to Geron, even if the 
rights accrued retrospectively.8 [emphasis added] 
Thus, there were two main points at issue: WARF's further obliga-
tions to Geron (if any) pe1iaining to adding new cell types since the date 
for the option to be exercised had lapsed; and the scope of the "Research 
Products" clause in the 1999 agreement. John S. Skilton of Heller 
Ehrman White & McAuliffe LLP, counsel for WARF, explained that 
WARF wished to licence cell types to third parties but, based on Geron's 
interpretation of the clause, feared Geron's likely interference.9 Skilton 
argued that this interpretation was entirely inconsistent with the intent of 
the parties and that WARF had met its duties under the licencing 
agreement. In support, he pointed to such cornerstones of contract law as 
rules of interpretation, good faith, and fair dealing in the amended 
complaint and brief filed at the Western District of Wisconsin Federal 
Court on September 24 and October 30of2001 respectively. But there is 
an overarching concern cited in both documents - the need to preserve 
the public interest in hESC research. 
2. The New Agreement 
On January 9, 2002, WARF and Geron announced that they resolved 
the federal lawsuit and have entered into a new licensing agreement for 
the "commercialization" of hESC technology. 10 
The statement released by WARF describing the new agreement 
reads, in part, as follows: 
8 Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 5-6,, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation 
v. Geron Corporation, D. Wisc. (F. Cir. 2001) (No. 01-C-0459). 
9 Ibid., at 6-7. 
10 Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, ''WARF and Geron Resolve Lawsuit and Sign 
New License" (9 Janua1y 2002), online: WARF <http://www.warf.ws/news/> (date accessed: 
02/01/09). 
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In the new license, Geron holds exclusive rights to develop therapeutic 
and diagnostic products from hESC-derived neural, cardiomyocyte 
and pancreatic islet cells. Geron also has non-exclusive rights to 
develop therapeutic and diagnostic products from hESC-derived he-
matopoietic, chondrocyte, and osteoblast cells. The agreement also 
grants Geron non-exclusive rights to develop research products in the 
following cell types: hepatocytes, neural cells, hematopoietic cells, 
osteoblasts, pancreatic islets and myocytes. 
WARF and Geron have further agreed to grant research rights to 
existing hESC patents and patent filings to academic and governmen-
tal researchers without royalties or fees. WiCell Research Institute, a 
WARF subsidiary, will distribute the cell lines. Third party for-profit 
companies may form collaborations with Geron or obtain licenses to 
Geron's intellectual property on market terms. 11 
There are two key elements of this new deal. First, Geron's propri-
etary interest has been enlarged: the company acquired the rights to 
develop therapeutic and diagnostic applications for six cell types (three 
on an exclusive basis and three non-exclusively), and the rights to 
develop research products for six cell types on a non-exclusive basis. 
Second, WARF, under the auspices ofWiCell, can grant research rights 
to public researchers on existing hESC patents and patent filings. 
A voiding litigation, which was likely to be long, is a good thing and 
not just to the immediate parties. The clause allowing WARF to supply 
hESC research materials to other researchers is significant. But is the 
resolution reached truly consistent with the public interest in hESC 
research? The new agreement does nothing, for instance, to preclude 
Geron from patenting, and thereby controlling access to, diagnostic or 
therapeutic applications with neural or cardiomyocyte cell types for 
neurological disorders or heart disease in the future. 
HI. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN 
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 
Even if the matter had seen the inside of a courtroom, with the 
weight of the U.S. President's decision emphasizing the importance of 
II Ibid. 
202 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
hESC research on the court's shoulders, it is almost inconceivable to 
imagine a ruling against WARF. In any event, the scenario presents a 
perfect platform upon which to consider the antecedent question: should 
the hESC materials and technologies have been patentable and therefore 
licensable in the first place? W ARF's counsel, of course, did not frame 
the public interest question in this manner. However, policy-makers in 
this global community need to consider this prior question to evaluate 
whether the public interest is served. 
1. The Goal of hESC Research 
In the wake of the 1998 Thomson experiments, the attention to 
hESC research in the media, the scientific literature, the philosophical/ 
bioethical literature, and in the realm of public policy debates has been 
nothing short of stupefying. The research has been hailed as the basis for 
developing cures for a spectrum of conditions including Parkinson's 
disease, Alzheimer's disease, and diabetes to name only a few. 12 And, 
many have argued that we are morally bound to aggressively pursue this 
avenue of research. 13 Guidelines issued by various committees routinely 
opt to push the research agenda forward notwithstanding strong opposi-
tion to the destruction of embryos for the derivation of hESC lines, 
piecemeal regulation, 14 and the existence of less controversial alterna-
tives (e.g. adult stem cell research). 15 
This suggests that the reason for pursuing hESC research is the 
possibility to alleviate a vast aITay of human suffering. It follows that 
hESC research should serve a social goal: increasing human health and 
well-being. 16 The potential for economic benefit should therefore be of 
secondary importance. 
12 E.g., National Institutes of Health (NIH), Stem Cells: Scientific Progress and Future 
Research Directions (July 200 I), online: NIH <http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcell/ 
scireport.htm> (date accessed: 01/12/13). 
13 E.g., G. McGee & A. Caplan, "The Ethics and Politics of Small Sacrifices in Stem Cell 
Research" (1999) 9:2 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 151at153. 
14 See generally, M. Herder, "The U.K. Model: setting the standard for embryonic stem cell 
research?" Health L. Rev. [forthcoming in 2002]. 
15 E.g., G. Vogel "Can Adult Stem Cells Suffice?" (2001) 292:5523 Science 1820. 
16 One author has opined that this is always the goal when the research involves human 
biological materials. See E.R. Gold, "Making Room: Reintegrating Basic Research, Health 
Policy, and Ethics into Patent Law" in T. Caulfield & B. Williams-Jones, eds., The Commer-
cialization of Genetic Research: Ethical, Legal, and Policy Issues (New York: Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers, 1999) 63 at 65 [hereinafter "Making Room"]. 
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Interestingly, hESC research policies and guidelines do not ex-
pressly recognize the dual benefits of this research. In this way, direct 
prioritization is avoided. Here, it is important to ask what is truly driving 
the research agenda? On one hand, the public is being asked to support 
hESC research because of its potential health benefits. And, there is a 
research community seemingly committed to realizing the health ben-
efits of hESC research for society. But on the other hand, economic 
interests are protected: legislation and guidelines already in place or 
enduring the drafting process are typically silent on the issue of patent-
ability .17 Thus, while therapeutic applications remain years away, the 
process of commercialization is accelerating at a rapid rate. WARF and 
Geron are amongst the trailblazers. 
Clearly, the public face given to hESC research concerns the health-
oriented goal. Commercialization enthusiasts, WARF and Geron in-
cluded, typically invoke the potential health benefits to support their 
position. But what guarantee exists that the potential health benefits are 
the primary impetus for hESC research? The absence of an explicit 
prioritization from any source is conspicuous. A closer inquiry into the 
present state of affairs may provide a measure of insight. Provided that 
the public interest in hESC research is represented by moving towards 
the goal of increasing health and well-being first and foremost, cogent 
arguments demonstrating that intellectual property rights facilitate that 
transition - not the transition from research tool to commercial product-
are necessary. 
2. Achieving Greater Health and Well-being 
There is no definitive empirical support for the proposition that 
intellectual property rights increase scientific innovation. 18 Statements 
that posit such a positive correlation reflect little more than self-serving 
intuitions. 19 Why then does patenting hESC technologies constitute the 
starting position? Two main arguments appear to underlie this reality: 
(i) the researchers who through their labour 'invent' the technolo-
gies are entitled to an ownership right in respect of those 
technologies (Lockean argument); and, 
17 Herder, supra note 14. 
18 "Making Room", supra note 16 at 68. 
19 Ibid. 
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(ii) circumscribing access to patented technologies in order to se-
cure monetary investment is permissible because an overall 
benefit for the public good will be produced (utilitarian argu-
ment).20 
In relation to the omnibus goal of hESC research, these two trains of 
thought operate quite differently. Whereas the utilitarian argument 
claims to increase the common good, the Lockean view only stipulates 
that burdens may not be imposed on third paiiies. In this analysis the 
common good need not be advanced. In this sense the Lockean argu-
ment is irrelevant to this essay's central criterion. Insofar as it does plays 
a part in preserving the status quo, it is useful to examine it at least as a 
preliminary matter. 
(i) Locke's labour theory argument: a question of entitlement 
Increasingly, researchers in the biomedical field have regarded 
patent rights as entitlements.21 Some have attributed this mindset shift to 
a top-down change in policy,22 or law-and-norms working synergisti-
cally.23 Others ascribe it to the maturation of biotechnological science 
itself.24 Irrespective of the precise source of this change, it is a valuable 
exercise to delve into the logic behind this claim. 
(A) The Lonely Scientist 
Thomson et al. may believe the hESC technologies they have devel-
oped are patent-worthy, because they represent their ingenuity and their 
work. This is in line with Locke's theory, which aims to justify private 
property rights based upon notions oflabour and deseii.25 However, this 
20 K. Lebacqz, "Who 'Owns' Cells and Tissues?" (2001) 9 Health Care Analysis 353 at 358-
59. 
21 M.A. Heller & R.S. Eisenberg, "Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research" (1998) 280:5364 Science 698 at 698 [hereinafter "The Anticommons"]. 
22 E.g., R.S. Eisenberg, "Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology 
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research" (1996) 82 Va. L. Rev. 1663. 
23 E.g., A.K. Rai, "Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms 
of Science" (1999) 94 Nw. U.L. Rev. 77. 
24 E.R. Gold, "Finding common cause in the patent debate" (2000) 18 Nature Biotechnology 
1217. 
25 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Govemment, Book II, Ch. 5, P. Laslet ed., 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967). 
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view presupposes that the rights claimant is in fact claiming a right over 
his or her own labour. But scientific progress is an "interdependent 
social project".26 In other words, it is a communitarian (not an isolated) 
endeavor. By rewarding a single investigator or group of investigators, 
the patent system necessarily distorts the communitarian nature of this 
project. Hettinger poignantly describes this absurdity: "[a] person who 
relies on human intellectual history and makes a small modification to 
produce something of great value should no more receive what the 
market will bear than should the last person needed to lift a car receive 
full credit for lifting it".27 The work done by WARF researchers was a 
contribution, albeit an extremely significant one, in a greater scientific 
project to eradicate forms of human disease. Perhaps the cure for 
Alzheimer's disease will be developed by one laboratory, but could that 
achievement be isolated from all previous efforts? In the language of the 
Patent Act,28 the answer is a resounding 'yes', however, that does not 
mean it makes sense. 
(B) Discove1y v. Invention 
The preceding view of scientific inquiry is perhaps too idealistic. To 
be sure, the practice of seeking patents for inventions seems deeply 
entrenched if not enforced in biomedical research culture.29 But an 
important distinction should be kept in mind: scientific discovery versus 
scientific invention. It is more problematic to argue that a finite number 
of investigators ought to be rewarded by a patent for a scientific discov-
ery as opposed to an invention. 
On its surface, the current legislation in Canada reflects this think-
ing. The Patent Act stipulates that only "inventions" - "any new and 
useful art process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement in any art, process, machine, manufac-
ture or composition of matter" - are patentable.30 This definitional 
2" N. Brett, "Private Life: Biotechnology and the Public/Private Divide" (August 200 I) at 16 
[unpublished, part of the Legal Dimensions Initiative for the Law Commission of Canada] 
[hereinafter "The Public/Private Divide"]. 
27 Ibid., at 17 quoting E. Hettinger, "Justifying Intellectual Property" (1989) Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 18 at 38. 
28 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4. 
29 Rai, supra note 23 at I 09-11. 
30 Patent Act, supra note 28, s. 2. 
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requirement has been adhered to in prior case-law. For instance, in 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), Justice 
Lamer, held that "[t]he courts have regarded creations following the 
laws of nature as being mere discoveries the existence of which man 
[sic] has simply uncovered without thereby being able to claim he [sic] 
has invented them".31 Similarly, the trial judge in President and Fellows 
of Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) maintained 
that "[a]nything that is merely a discovery is not patentable subject-
matter". 32 
Given that the source of hESC lines and types, embryos, exist in 
nature33 how can they be patentable? The answer offered relates to the 
qualification Lamer J. put on his remarks in Pioneer Hi-Bred - "the 
nature of the intervention"34 - i.e. the innovation occurs by deriving the 
hESC line or type. 35 Brett points out that the question whether it is 
invented gets collapsed into the question "is its usefulness a product of 
the invention?"36 
So, only hESC lines and types that have been derived are patentable 
(i.e. hESC types in their pre-derived state in the embryo are not patent-
able because no intervention has taken place). But collapsing the ques-
tion in this way skips a step. It does not follow that hESC lines or types 
are new, i.e. an invention, because a method of derivation has been 
constructed.37 "The acceptance of this as a legitimate basis for the 
patenting of discoveries would provide a wide and slippery slope toward 
the privatization of whatever scientists find". 38 This logical error is 
compounded by the very nature of intellectual property rights, which 
negatively impact third parties. For example, patents for a particular 
hESC line or type extend beyond the basic research to testing and 
therapeutic applications.39 Alternative tests or therapies are less likely to 
31 (1989), 60 D.L.R. (4th) 223 at 231 [hereinafter Pioneer Hi-Bred]. 
32 [1998] 3 F.C. 510 (T.D.) at para 26. 
33 Arguably, embryos created through in vitro fertilization do not exist in nature. Creating IVF 
embryos necessarily involves scientific intervention, but should the embryos themselves be 
patentable? Should the intervention be patentable? What is the difference? 
34 Supra note 31 at 23 I. 
35 "The Public/Private Divide", supra note 26 at 26. 
36 Ibid., at 22. 
37 See Brett, supra note 26 at 23. 
38 Ibid., at 26. 
39 Ibid., at 26-27. This is vividly illustrated by the recent actions of Myriad Genetics Corpora-
tion, which holds the patent on the 'breast cancer genes'. It is attempting to charge a $3000 
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be developed because of potential patent infringements.40 Patent-hold-
ers can require fee-for-use of the controlled technologies or even pro-
hibit researchers from improving the technologies throughout the desig-
nated period. Coupled with this discovery quality, this overbreadth runs 
counter to an argument in favour of these patents as of right. 
In contrast, the processes for deriving hESC lines and types can be 
readily characterized as inventions. However, can a distinction between 
those processes and the materials they produce be drawn? Since hESC 
lines and types cannot exist absent derivation technologies, is an entitle-
ment to patent the latter sufficient to support an entitlement, in effect, to 
the former? An ownership right that overreaches in this way requires 
added justification. Possibly the utilitarian argument is able to compen-
sate. 
(ii) The utilitarian argument: patents will benefit the public good 
From a utilitarian perspective though, the preceding criticisms do 
not matter. So long as a patent has a net positive effect (e.g. the patent-
holders construct a derivation process for a specific type of neural cell), 
imposing burdens on others (e.g. preventing other researchers from 
using that derivation technology to produce that neural cell type), even 
'harming' others (e.g. obtaining embryos for experiments without in-
formed consent), is justifiable. As mentioned at the outset, what remains 
hidden in this reasoning is the fact that the assumption that intellectual 
property rights facilitate scientific innovation is itself open to challenge. 
There are reasons to suggest that an overall increase in utility does not 
occur. If the other researchers referred to in the above example had 
access to the technology that is capable of producing that neural cell 
type, they may have developed a therapy for a neurological disorder 
before the patent-holders, or in a more cost-effective manner. 
(A) The "Tragedy of the Anti-commons" and Transaction Costs 
Intellectual property rights represent barriers for follow-on improv-
ers. The effect of these barriers can differ depending upon whether the 
patents pertain to basic ("upstream") research technologies or applied 
dollar fee for anyone who wants to be tested for the genes. See T. Caulfield & E.R. Gold, "The 
Dark Side of Gene Patenting" The Ottawa Citizen (21November2001) A19. 
40 "The Public/Private Divide", supra note 26 at 27. 
208 - DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
("downstream") research technologies. Whereas a patent relating to a 
downstream technology can preclude other researchers from improving 
upon that particular technology, patents on upstream technologies can 
preclude other researchers from improving or developing a whole host 
of technologies. The patents held by WARF are of the upstream variety 
-the relevant technologies will hopefully (from Geron's point-of-view) 
serve as the basis for any number of (lucrative) applications. Recall the 
new licensing agreement. Geron aims to develop diagnostic and thera-
peutic applications in respect of six cell types. 
Heller and Eisenberg have dubbed this phenomenon the "tragedy of 
the anticommons": 
The problem we identify is distinct from the routine underuse inherent 
in any well-functioning patent system. By conferring monopolies in 
discoveries, patents necessarily increase prices and restrict use - a cost 
society pays to motivate invention and disclosure. The tragedy of the 
anticornmons refers to the more complex obstacles that arise when a 
user needs access to multiple patented inputs to create a single useful 
product. Each upstream patent allows its owner to set up another 
tollbooth on the road to product development, adding to the cost and 
slowing the pace of downstream biomedical innovation.41 
Although the article focused upon the patenting of DNA sequences and 
expressed sequence tags (ESTs), Heller and Eisenberg's analysis applies 
equally to hESC technologies. Downstream hESC research may involve 
multiple cell types so the tragedy of the anti commons can result where 
the patents for each cell type are held by multiple researchers. Alterna-
tively, even if the rights to multiple cell types or the corresponding 
derivation processes are held collectively, the patent-holder can licence 
them on a per-item basis. Again the anticommons tragedy can ensue. 
Heller and Eisenberg acknowledge that this tragedy may actually 
prove to be illusory as parties negotiating licensing agreements gain 
experience and patents continue to attract enough investment to support 
upstream research in the long term - the end may justify the means.42 
But three "structural concerns" inherent in the patent system provide 
added reason to doubt that overall utility will increase.43 First, the 
interests of the parties may not coincide. Compare WARF and Geron: 
41 "The Anticommons", supra note 21 at 699. 
42 Ibid., at 700. 
43 Ibid. 
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on one level, revenue motives (universities/institutions) and profit mo-
tives (corporations) can be at odds with one another. To maximize 
revenue, institutions need to licence non-exclusively to secure maxi-
mum royalties, unless the fee offered for a single exclusive licence is 
greater. From a corporation's perspective, monopolies offer the greatest 
return. More fundamentally, the parties may simply have different 
goals: Thomson et al. wanted to make available the basic research tools 
to other public researchers whereas Geron wanted to increase the value 
of its portfolio. The result of this underlying tension: negotiations over a 
new agreement were repeatedly frustrated and the parties became en-
gaged in a federal lawsuit. 
"Transaction costs" constitute the second identified impediment to 
net benefits.44 In this arena standard licence terms are likely to be rare, 
such that negotiations may only take place on a case-by-case (or cell 
type by cell type) basis.45 Each transaction therefore carries a cost, and 
the overall cost to a researcher rises in proportion to the number of 
patents that bear upon the chosen research agenda. Even where negotia-
tions go smoothly and the subsequent research proves fruitful, transac-
tion costs may be further exacerbated by "strategic behaviour", where 
"[t]he original patentee [uses] its patent as a "holdup" right, so as to 
appropriate as much of the value of the improvement as possible".46 
Transaction costs are in paii a function of valuation difficulties and 
this speaks directly to the third structural concern, namely "the cognitive 
biases among researchers".47 Heller and Eisenberg suspect that re-
searchers often overvalue their discoveries.48 If a fraction of the promise 
associated with hESC research is realized, placing a monetary value 
upon an hESC line or type would seem impossible. Thus, regardless of 
whether these "inventions" are overvalued by the researcher, this uncer-
tainty drastically undern1ines "the assumption that licencing agreements 




4" Rai, supra note 23 at 128. 
47 "The Anticommons", supra note 21 at 701 . 
48 Ibid. 
49 Rai, supra note 23 at 125. 
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(B) Scientific Creativity 
The utilitarian argument is also undercut by what Rai refers to as 
"creativity costs".5° Contrary to assertions that coordination by a single 
rightsholder promotes efficient research and development, "progress in 
basic science occurs most quickly ... when different teams of scientists, 
working independently but with an awareness of each other's efforts, 
use divergent approaches to the same problem". 51 Since "many new 
technologies come into existence in relatively embryonic form'',52 re-
searcher independence is absolutely crucial. The WARF subsidiary, 
WiCell, did not appear to succumb to pressure from Geron. How often 
will that be the case? 
Monopoly rights create added incentive for development, but this 
must be offset against these external creativity costs. Scientific creativ-
ity may also be constrained internally, by an organization's own orienta-
tion. Given that patent-holders, particularly those in the private sector, 
are likely to pursue research that is profit-oriented while "necessary and 
good health research" does not always translate into financial gain,53 
(near) monopolies threaten to eliminate this other less-profitable re-
search altogether. This surely does not factor positively into the utilitar-
ian calculus. Not all hESC research will lead to life-saving therapies, yet 
where so little is known, can society afford for the research agenda to be 
limited by strict 'bottom-line' motives? 
In sum, it is not clear that the intellectual property framework yields 
a net benefit to society. The point is buttressed where the research in 
question is funded wholly or partly, by public funds in which case 
patents, in effect, "require the public to pay twice for the same inven-
tion". 54 Like the Lockean entitlement argument, the utilitarian view 
seems to assume more than it is worth. Consequently, the view that the 
potential health benefits of hESC research constitute the top priority is 
undermined. 
so Ibid., at 136. 
51 Ibid., at 124. 
52 Ibid. 
53 E.R. Gold, "Biomedical Patents and Ethics: A Canadian Solution" (2000) 45 McGill L.J. 
413 at 429. 
54 Eisenberg, supra note 22 at 1666. 
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IV. LESSONS FOR CANADA 
The notion that intellectual prope1iy rights facilitate a move towards 
increased health and well-being through hESC research is not substanti-
ated by convincing arguments. But a bigger problem remains. Other 
attacks surrounding the sanctity and special status of human biological 
materials for instance, have had no impact on patent policy.ss Gold notes 
that industry proponents and patent critics tend to simply "argue past 
each other".s6 In principle, the foregoing illustration should be more 
persuasive because it elucidates the weaknesses of the patent enthusi-
asts' argument from within the patent scheme itself. 
This new sphere of research is charged with controversy. The patent 
system provides a means for policy-makers to avoid confronting diffi-
cult value and ethical debates.s7 Canada has condoned hESC research 
within limits. But no real limit has been placed upon commercialization. 
It is important to recognize that this is essentially a choice, one which 
should not go unquestioned. The public interest in hESC research cannot 
be safeguarded where the market is gatekeeper. 58 
1. Modifying the Patent System 
Intellectual property law is poorly fashioned to achieve the social 
goal of hESC research.59 It may be possible to re-equip the patent 
system to address some of the concerns highlighted here. Three catego-
ries of responses include: 
(i) Clar(fication of the Existing Criteria 
Interpreting patents more nmTowly in general may help to reduce 
transaction and creativity costs. A more focused approach involves 
stringently applying the "utility" requirement, so that ESTs of unknown 
function for example, would not be patentable.60 On the other hand, the 
55 T. Caulfied, E.R. Gold, & M.K. Cho, "Patenting human genetic material: refocusing the 
debate" (2000) 1 Nature Reviews Genetics 227 [hereinafter "Patenting human genetic mate-
rial"]. 
56 E.R. Gold, "Moving the gene patent debate forward: A framework for achieving compro-
mise between industry and civil society" (2000) 18 Nature Biotechnology 1319. 
57 "Making Room", supra note 16 at 68. 
58 Ibid., at 68-69. 
59 "Patenting human genetic material", supra note 55 at 228. 
60 Ibid., at 230. 
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processes invented to derive hESC lines and types are clearly useful. 
Thus, relying on a stricter application of the utility doctrine would not be 
sufficient to address the problems of access previously noted. 
(ii) Research Exemptions 
(A) Experimental Use 
Fear of costly patent infringement litigation may preclude research-
ers from undertaking valuable research.61 In the U.S., research that is not 
"purely philosophic" is potentially subject to such an attack.62 Broaden-
ing the ambit of an experimental-use exception may allow a greater 
number of researchers to conduct basic research in emerging areas of 
science. There is precedent for doing so in the European communities.63 
(B) Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents 
Related to the experimental-use exemption, Merges has proposed 
employing the reverse doctrine of equivalents to facilitate negotiations 
between patent-holders and follow-on improvers where the invention is 
or operates in a substantially different manner than the patented inven-
tion. 64 Where a court finds a significant amount of"value-added" to the 
invention, infringement litigation should fail. 65 
(C) Compulsory Licencing 
Gold suggests that compulsory licencing could be used with respect 
to "research tools such as ESTs, genes, and cell-lines".66 It operates by 
allowing "a third party to use a patented invention without permission 
by the patent holder for a reasonable fee". 67 He notes that compulsory 
licencing is an attractive alternative for three main reasons: first, "a 
patent holder would not be able to prevent a competitor from using the 
tool since the competitor would not be entitled to a licence on commer-
61 Ibid. 
62 "Making Room", supra note 16 at 71. 
63 Ibid. 
64 R. Merges, "Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking 
Patents" (1994) 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 75 at 81-82. 
65 Rai, supra note 23 citing R. Merges, "A Brief Note on Blocking Patents and Reverse 
Equivalents: Biotechnology as an Example" (1991) 73 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc 'y 878 at 
887-88. 
66 "Making Room", supra note 16 at 72. 
67 Ibid. 
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cial terms"; second, it ''would prevent prohibitive or anti-competitive 
licencing terms with respect to basic technology"; and, third, compul-
sory licencing "would prevent the monopolization of early-stage tech-
nologies so that competition can take place with respect to end prod-
ucts". 68 As a result, compulsory licencing may markedly reduce patent 
barriers to upstream research while preserving economic incentives at 
the other end.69 
Gold's view is pragmatic. Yet the health benefits of hESC research 
only become tangible to society at the application ( diagnostic/therapeu-
tic) end. Is the balance that Gold sketches therefore ill-advised? Further, 
a primary problem for both the compulsory licencing and experimental-
use approaches concerns valuation. Given that researchers and industry 
actors with intimate knowledge of the state of the science and market 
respectively are not likely to agree upon the value of these materials, it is 
arguably futile to place the burden of formulating royalty figures on the 
judiciary.70 With respect to the reverse doctrine of equivalents, the 
problem of transaction costs, which stifles research ab initio, is left 
unaddressed. 71 
(iii) Activating a Public Order/Morality Exclusion 
Knoppers has suggested that a public order or morality exclusion 
similar to the one employed by the European Patent Convention might 
be a means to deny patents where it would be contrary to public policy.72 
What would in fact be contrary to public policy is not clear. Not 
surprisingly, in Europe this provision has seldom been applied. 73 For 
example, the challenges against patenting the oncomouse using this 
provision failed. 74 In Canada, where the patentability of the oncomouse 
is still pending, courts have been loathe to give effect to patent officials' 
attempts to implement public policy considerations.75 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Rai, supra note 23 at 141-42. 
71 Ibid., at 142. 
72 B.M. Knoppers, M. Hirtle, & K.C. Glass, "Commercialization of Genetic Research and 
Public Policy" (1999) 286:5448 Science 2277. 
73 Ibid. 
74 "Patenting human genetic material", supra note 55 at 228. 
75 E.g., President and Fellows of' Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) 
[2000] 4 F.C. 528 (C.A.). 
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2. Placing hESC Research in the Public Domain 
(i) Non-Patentable Discoveries 
The most direct way to ensure access to hESC lines, types and 
derivation processes is to deny patents on those technologies alto-
gether. 76 The circumstances described above - poorly constructed en-
titlement claims and unsubstantiated claims about a net increase in 
utility - warrant invoking this response for now. The other options 
constitute ad hoc attempts to minimize the challenges raised by new 
forms of biomedical research like hESC research.77 Valuation problems 
are more or less eliminated once hESC research is placed in the public 
domain.78 Where exclusive appropriation is not in the public interest, it 
is not evident why such subject matter should be patented at all. 79 In the 
instant case, WARF did favour a greater degree of access. Geron was 
more or less oblivious to equity considerations. But the litigation, had it 
gone ahead, would have been confined to a later stage. The public 
interest in hESC research would have been defined with specific atten-
tion to intellectual property parameters. 
Fundamentally then, the three proposed modifications miss the 
point. Each fails to give express and meaningful priority to what should 
be the primary goal of hESC research: increased health and well-being. 
Absent the ability to judge the public interest in hESC research at the 
former stage, it is plainly illegitimate for that interest to rest (even in 
part) with a Federal Court in Wisconsin as a matter of fact. 
(ii) The Recommendation of the Standing Committee on Health 
When the "Proposals for Legislation Governing Assisted Human 
Reproduction"80 was introduced in May 200 l, the Minister of Health 
simultaneously charged the Standing Committee on Health with criti-
cally evaluating the legislation. Six months later, the Committee made 
76 "Making Room", supra note 16 at 72. 
77 Ibid., at 74. 
78 See A.K. Rai, "Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property Rights: A Reply to 
Kieff' (2001) 95 Nw. U.L. Rev. 707 at 711. 
79 See Eisenberg, supra note 22 at 1725. 
80 Health Canada, Proposals for Legislation Governing Assisted Human Reproduction (May 
2001), online: Health Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/pdf/reproduction/ 
legislation.pdf> (date accessed: 01/05/09) [hereinafter "Draft Legislation"]. 
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several noteworthy recommendations. Perhaps most strikingly, the 
Committee made the following assertion: 
The Committee is seriously concerned about the patentability of hu-
man material. We are deeply disturbed that the Patent Act does not 
specifically disallow patenting with respect to human genes, DNA 
sequences, and cell lines. Treating human biological components is 
repugnant to many of us. It entails their commodification and paves 
the way for their commercialization. Given the importance that this 
Committee attaches to the respect of human dignity and integrity, we 
urge that patents be denied in relation to human material. There should 
be particular emphasis 011 the ethical and social consequences of 
patenting human material as well as 011 the implications for the devel-
opment and availability ofrelated therapies and corresponding costs to 
health care delivery in this country. 
Therefore, the Committee recommends that: 
The Patent Act be amended to prohibit patenting of humans as well as 
any human materials. 81 
If this recommendation were acted upon, patents on hESC lines and 
types (but seemingly not derivation processes) would not be permissible 
in Canada. The Committee's position appears to be based on general 
concerns about the status of human life. This approach is indeed laud-
able, but in the past, has fallen on deaf ears. Challenging patent advo-
cates on their level by engaging with the economic premises of their 
view may prove to be far more persuasive.82 
81 House of Commons Canada, Assisted Human Reproduction: Building Families (December 
200 I), online: Standing Committee on Health <http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoDocCom/37/I/ 
HEAL/Studies/Reports/healrpOl-e.htm> (date accessed: 01/12/13), at Section 12(iii), Recom-
mendation 34. 
82 Lebacqz, supra note 20 at 357. 
216- DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
V. CONCLUSION: 
PRIORITIZING THE BENEFITS OF HESC RESEARCH 
The WARF v. Geron case at its most basic level concerns starting 
positions. The true effect of intellectual property rights on hESC re-
search is difficult to decipher. The argument made here is that the 
burden to demonstrate that intellectual property rights actually aid in the 
development of diagnostic and therapeutic hESC applications, should 
lie on the pro-patent side. 
What course the Canadian government will take is unclear. Equally, 
the present amicability of the W ARF-Geron relationship may return to 
acrimony. But the answer to the question - who will profit is certain if 
the situation stays the same. Researchers, whether public or private, will 
profit from hESC research. Perhaps this would be permissible if an 
overall health benefit accrues to society at large or the researchers had a 
bona fide entitlement claim. Both of these claims, however, rest on 
shaky grounds. Nonetheless, the Draft Legislation as it now stands, 
reinforces the priority on profit. The view that researchers (and funding 
corporations) should be able to profit is pervasive across nation-states.83 
All of this suggests that the potential economic benefits of hESC re-
search are given higher priority. 
If policy-makers instead choose to act, there are two primary paths 
which they may take. One alternative involves tinkering with the intel-
lectual property system. The other alternative involves making hESC 
technologies non-patentable. Though a clear prioritization of health and 
economic benefits is not to be expected, choosing either one of these 
paths will be telling. To give the public face of hESC research meaning, 
hESC technologies will be exempted from the patent scheme. Con-
versely, if economic prospect is the primary driving force, modifications 
to the intellectual property framework will be enacted. In the latter 
scenario, it would be wise to take a more cautious stance regarding the 
potential health benefits of hESC research. 
83 Herder, supra note 14. Notably, the same rationale was implicitly endorsed by the California 
Supreme Court in Moore v. Regents o.lUniversity o.lCalif'ornia, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146 (Cal. 1990) 
cert. denied 111 S.Ct. 1388. 
